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DEFINING INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
 
Breen Creighton,* Catrina Denvir** and Shae McCrystal*** 
 
1. Introduction 
AN EMAIL WRITTEN IN CAPS LOCK IS AN IRRITATION TO THE RECIPIENT AND 
CAN DISRUPT THE EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING OF A BUSINESS.1 Customer services 
officers wearing union t-shirts, or airline pilots interrupting passengers to tell them about an 
industrial campaign, can be marginal inconveniences to the customers of a business. But the 
legal status of these annoyances or inconveniences can be of great significance to the 
operation of the bargaining regime put in place by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). 
That is because the question of whether such conduct constitutes ‘industrial action’ within the 
definition of that term in s 19 of the FW Act can have significant legal consequences. 
First, in a common law jurisdiction like Australia, most, if not all, worker industrial 
action would be unlawful as either or both of a tort and a breach of the worker’s contract of 
employment. Historically, it was commonly also unlawful under statute.2 The FW Act now 
provides some protection against common law and statutory liability for unions and 
employees who engage in industrial action in the context of negotiations for a single-
enterprise agreement, but the protection extends only to action which falls within the s 19 
definition. Any action which falls outside that definition will almost invariably be unlawful at 
common law and/or statute.  
Second, many (but not all) of the statutory liabilities for unprotected industrial action 
under the FW Act turn upon whether the conduct in question falls within the statutory 
definition. For example, s 418 of the FW Act enables an employer confronted by unprotected 
industrial action to seek an order from the FWC requiring that the action cease or not occur. 
Such orders can, in turn, be enforced in the Federal Court.3  
                                                            
* Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT University. 
** Director, Ulster Legal Innovation Centre, Ulster University. 
*** The University of Sydney School of Law, University of Sydney. The authors would like to thank the 
audience participants at the Australian Labour Law Association Conference held in Melbourne in November 
2016 and the anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1 For example, because communications need to be recalibrated b efore they can be sent to clients or customers 
of the employer. 
2 For discussion of these historical exposures, see Andrew Stewart, Anthony Forsyth, Mark Irving, Richard 
Johnstone & Shae McCrystal, Creighton & Stewart’s Labour Law, 6th ed, (Federation Press, 2016) [3.05]-
[3.19]. For discussion of contemporary exposures see ibid, [26.11]-[26.106]. 
3 Such action may also be unlawful at common law and/or under provisions such as ss 30J and 30K of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) or ss 45D-45EA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). See further Stewart et 
al, above n 2, ch 26; Carolyn Sappideen, Paul O’Grady & Joellen Riley, Macken’s Law of Employment, 8th ed, 
(Lawbook Co., 2016) [14.80]–[14.410]; Marilyn Pittard & Richard Naughton, Australian Labour and 
Employment Law (Lexis Nexis, 2015) ch 18. 
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Third, the FW Act makes it unlawful for an employer to pay wages in respect of a 
period where an employee has engaged in industrial action, and for an employee to seek or to 
accept such payment.4 Any lack of clarity around whether action constitutes industrial action 
could leave the employer or employees facing civil penalties where payment was not 
withheld for action that did constitute industrial action, whilst an employer could face 
penalties if they withheld wages in respect of action which did not fall within the statutory 
definition. 
Finally, s 524 of the FW Act permits an employer to stand down an employee without 
pay in circumstances (inter alia) where the employee ‘cannot usefully be employed because 
of … industrial action’ (other than that employer’s own industrial action). Here, the ability of 
employees who are not themselves taking industrial action to earn wages may turn on 
whether or not the conduct of co-workers, or the employees of another business altogether, 
falls within the s 19 definition. 
Manifestly, therefore, clarity in the definition of industrial action under the FW Act is 
of critical practical significance for a range of parties. As the examples outlined above 
demonstrate, unions engaged in enterprise bargaining under the FW Act often exhibit 
considerable creativity in the forms of industrial action they take in order to pressure 
employers to accede to their demands – preferably with minimum loss of income or other 
inconvenience for the employees concerned. Such creativity is pushing at the boundaries of 
the statutory definition, and one of the principal findings of this article is that the definition is 
increasingly unfit for purpose. 
The meaning and effect of the term ‘industrial action’ has been examined by a number 
of authors in a number of contexts. 5  However, there has not so far been any in-depth 
examination of the current definition in its social, historical or international context. With that 
in mind, this is article starts with an examination of the concept of ‘industrial action’. It then 
traces the approach to definition of industrial action (and cognate terms) in Australia over the 
years, culminating in s 19 of the FW Act.6 This is followed by a detailed examination of the 
meaning and effect of s 19 as it has been applied by the courts and tribunals.  
This examination clearly suggests that the s 19 definition is fundamentally flawed 
both in principle and in practice. This is largely a consequence of the fact that it is very much 
the product of a regulatory regime that was directed to the proscription of industrial action 
rather than its protection. The FW Act now purports both to proscribe and to protect. As 
indicated, it adopts a definition that is not fit for either purpose. As a result, it is almost 
impossible for stakeholders to determine what forms of industrial action are and are not 
                                                            
4 There are, however, qualifications to this in respect of partial work bans. See generally Stewart et al, above n 
2, [26.56]-[26.69]. 
5 See, eg, Stewart et al, above n 2, [26.20]-[26.27]; Shae McCrystal, The Right to Strike in Australia (Federation 
Press, 2010), 112-19, 242-43. 
6 Legislation in all of the States except Tasmania and Victoria includes definitions of ‘industrial action’ – see 
Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) s 4 and Dictionary; Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 4 and Schedule 
5; Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) s 4; and Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s 7. With the referral of legislative 
power by all jurisdictions apart from Western Australia, the State definitions are now of limited practical 
relevance, and are not examined in this article. 
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legally permissible, or to ascertain what are to be the legal and other consequences of 
engaging in certain forms of industrial conduct. The legislation also denies protection to 
certain forms of worker behaviour that ought to be protected to ensure that Australia gives 
proper effect to its obligations in international law. Bearing these considerations in mind, the 
authors offer a number of suggestions for an approach to the definition of industrial action 
that address the ambiguities and conceptual confusion that characterise the current provision. 
 
 
 
2. What is ‘industrial action’? 
2.1 The Concept 
According to the Macquarie Dictionary ‘industrial action’ comprises ‘organised disruptive 
action, as a strike or go-slow, taken by a group of workers, to promote what they conceive to 
be either their own interests or the general public good’. 
This encapsulates the key elements of the commonplace understanding of industrial action: 
• it is collective in character; 
• it involves workers, usually organised in a trade union; 
• it is intended to be disruptive – for example by halting or interfering with productive 
activity;  
• it is purposive or coercive in that its principal purpose is to exert pressure on the target 
of the action (most obviously an employer) to accede to the demands of the workers 
who are taking the action; and 
• it is primarily motivated by self-interest, although occasionally worker participants 
may be motivated by more altruistic concerns. Self-interest could clearly include 
seeking improvements in terms and conditions of employment or protecting work 
practices or job security. Altruistic drivers could include environmental protection or 
protest against the exploitation of children or young persons in overseas workplaces.7 
The most obvious form of industrial action is the strike – what the Macquarie 
describes as ‘a concerted stopping of work or withdrawal of workers’ services in order to 
compel an employer to accede to demands or in protest against terms and conditions imposed 
by an employer’. Indeed, in many respects the term ‘industrial action’ can be regarded as 
coterminous with ‘strike’, especially if that term is accorded the kind of expanded 
interpretation which, as appears below, has been adopted by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). 
However characterised, industrial action can encompass a wide range of activities 
which go beyond the dictionary definition of ‘strike’. They include:  
                                                            
7 See, eg, ‘Green bans revived to halt redevelopment of iconic Bondi building’, Workplace Express, 31 May 
2016; ‘Mundey re-emerges for new Rocks green bans’, Workplace Express, 16 September 2016. 
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• a go-slow or work-to-rule, where workers continue to perform work but do so at a 
reduced pace. Often this is achieved by means of a strict adherence to the rules of the 
workplace;8 
• partial work bans, where workers impose restrictions on the performance of certain 
parts of the job with a view to disrupting the normal course of the employer’s 
business;  
• posting pickets at or near an employer’s workplace with one or more of a number of 
objectives, including: trying to persuade fellow-workers not to work; encouraging 
clients or customers of the target employer not to do business with the target; or 
disrupting the passage of goods, services or people into or out of the workplace; 
• boycotting goods or services emanating from, or destined for, a particular source; 
• industrial sabotage, for example by facilitating a breakdown of machinery or a 
coordinated failure to report for work because of ‘illness’; and 
• occupation of workplaces. 
Interestingly, the Macquarie definition does not contemplate industrial action by 
employers. Clearly, however, employers can and do take industrial action, either to promote 
their own interests and/or to respond to action by employees. Most obviously, this would 
include a lockout, which the Macquarie defines as ‘the closing of a business, or wholesale 
dismissal of employees by the employer because the employees refuse to accept his terms or 
because the employer refuses to operate on terms set by a union’.  
Employer industrial action can, however, take a number of other forms, including: 
denial of opportunities to work overtime; withholding non-contractual bonus payments; 
relocation of a business; and directing investment decisions away from industrially militant 
workplaces. As appears below, the FW Act accords only very limited recognition to the 
capacity of employers to take industrial action, whilst international standards on the right to 
strike do not require that there be formal recognition of the right of employers to take 
industrial action, although nor do they proscribe it.  
      
2.2 ILO Standards 
Neither the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 
1948 (No 87) nor the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No 98) 
make any express reference to ‘industrial action’ or indeed to the right to strike. Nevertheless, 
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) has consistently read articles 3, 8 and 10 of Convention No 87 as protecting the 
right to strike,9 although it should be noted that this reading of Convention No 87 has come 
under increasing criticism by employer representatives, and some governments, in recent 
                                                            
8 See eg Secretary of State for Employment v Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (No 2) 
[1972] 2 QB 455. 
9 See Ruth Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer, 1987); Tonia 
Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (OUP, 2003) 110-20. As to the substance 
of the jurisprudence see Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero and Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the 
Right to Strike (ILO, 2000) (see also (1998) 137 ILR 441); McCrystal, above n 5, ch 2. 
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years.10 Nevertheless, it remains the case that both Convention No 87, and the principles of 
freedom of association as applied by the Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of 
Association (CFA), affords protection to a broadly drawn notion of the right to strike.11 
It is also important to note that art 8(1)(d) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) expressly protects ‘the right to strike’, ‘provided it is 
exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country’.  
 In the ILO context, both the CEACR and the CFA have acknowledged that the 
internationally protected right to strike includes other forms of industrial action such as ‘wild-
cat strikes, tools-down, go-slow, working to rule and sit-down strikes’.12 The CEACR has 
specifically indicated that picketing and occupying workplaces constitute the legitimate 
exercise of the right to strike – subject to the qualifier that the action concerned must be 
peaceful.13  
 It is clear, therefore, that the right to strike as recognised by the supervisory bodies of 
the ILO encompasses a wide range of worker actions which are intended to exert pressure 
upon employers in an industrial context, and upon governments and other parties concerning 
‘economic and social policy questions’ and ‘labour problems of any kind which are of direct 
concern to the workers’.14 Thus understood, the ILO jurisprudence concerning the right to 
strike appears to provide an appropriate reference point for an analysis of the approach to 
‘industrial action’ that has been adopted in Australia – especially in light of the fact that this 
country is required to respect the principles of freedom of association by virtue of its 
membership of the ILO, and must give effect to the requirements of Convention No 87 and 
Art 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR by virtue of its ratification of those instruments. 
The right to strike as recognised by the ILO does not extend to employer lockouts. 
The same is true for the ICESCR.15 None of this means that recognition of the capacity to 
lockout in national law and practice is inherently inconsistent with the internationally 
                                                            
10 See, for example, Novitz, above n 9, 120-23; Claire La Hovary, ‘Showdown at the ILO? A Historical 
Perspective on the Employers’ Group’s Challenge to the Right to Strike’ (2013) 42 Industrial Law Journal 338. 
11 See ILC, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey by the Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 69th Session, 1983, Report III (Part 4B), [200] (1983 
General Survey). See also ILC, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey by the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 81st Session, 1994, Report III 
(Part 4B), [147]-[151] (1994 General Survey); ILC, Giving globalisation a human face: General Survey on the 
fundamental Conventions concerning rights at work in light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalisation, 2008, 101st Session, 2012, Report III (Part 1B), [117] (2012 General Survey). 
12 ILO, Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of 
the ILO, 5th ed (ILO, 2006) [545]-[546] (Digest); 1994 General Survey, above n 11, [173]. Paragraph 126 of the 
2012 General Survey is to the same effect. 
13 Ibid, [174]. See further ATJM Jacobs, ‘The Law of Strikes and Lockouts’, in Roger Blanpain (ed), 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market Economies, XIth ed (Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014) 759-62. 
14 Both Committees consider that purely political strikes do not fall within the scope of the right to strike – see 
1994 General Survey, above n 11, [165]; 2012 General Survey, above n 11, [124]; Digest, above n 12, [528]-
[529].  
15 In Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 547 the High Court found that provisions in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (IR Act) (as amended in 1993) protecting the employer right to lock out were not 
‘reasonably capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted’ to giving effect to the right to strike as required 
by Art 8(1)(d). 
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recognised right to strike: indeed, international standards implicitly recognise the legitimacy 
of the lock out in certain contexts.16 It remains the case, however, that the capacity to lockout 
is not explicitly protected by international law.  
 
3. The Origins of section 19 of the FW Act 
3.1 The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904  
The C&A Act as originally enacted did not contain any reference to, let alone definition of, 
‘industrial action’, and did not afford any protection against common law liability in respect 
of such action. On the contrary, it made both strikes and lockouts criminal offences, 
punishable by a fine of up to £1,000.17  
‘Strike’ for this purpose included ‘the total or partial cessation of work by employees, 
acting in combination, as a means of enforcing compliance with demands made by them or 
other employees on employers’, whilst a ‘lockout’ included ‘the closing of a place or a part of 
a place of employment, or the total or partial suspension of work by an employer, with a view 
to compel his employees, or to aid another employer in compelling his employees, to accept 
any term or condition of employment’.18 
The statutory prohibition of strikes and lockouts was repealed in 1930,19 and although 
the legislation remained extremely hostile to industrial action of any kind, it no longer made 
specific reference to either strikes or lockouts.20 The C&A Act did, however, contemplate the 
inclusion in awards of provisions prohibiting a union bound by an award from being 
concerned, directly or indirectly, in any ban or limitation on the performance of work in 
accordance with that award.21 These provisions were commonly referred to as ‘bans clauses’, 
and were extensively relied upon, especially in the 1950s and ’60s, as a means of trying to 
enforce the norms of the system of conciliation and arbitration. They fell into disuse 
following the ‘Clarrie O’Shea affair’ in 1969. This incident involved the imprisonment for 
contempt of court of a union official for refusing to facilitate the collection of fines which had 
been imposed on his union in respect of numerous breaches of bans clauses. O’Shea was 
released from prison after an anonymous benefactor paid the outstanding fines.22  
                                                            
16 See, eg, the ILO’s Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 1951 (No 92), cl 3(4). See also 
Digest, above n 12, [600], [853]. See also Jacobs, above n 13, 784-86. 
17 C&A Act s 6.  
18 C&A Act s 4. For detailed discussion of the legal definitions of strike and lockout in Australian statute law, 
see Edward I Sykes, Strike Law in Australia, 2nd ed, (Law Book Co, 1982) ch 6. 
19 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1930 s 4 repealed the definitions of strike and lockout, 
whilst s 6 repealed the statutory proscription of such conduct.  
20 For judicial consideration of the nature of a strike see McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343, 360-61 (per 
Dixon J), 372-78 (per Evatt J); Kidd v Savage River Mines (1984) 6 FCR 398, 404-06 (per Gray J).  
21 The C&A Act did not contain any definition of ‘ban’, although up until 1977 it did contain a definition of 
‘work ban’ for the limited purpose of the compulsory ballot provision in the then s 45 – see further n 24, below.  
22 Interestingly, the contempt was never formally purged. For discussion see Jack Hutson, Penal Colony to 
Penal Powers, rev ed, (Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights’ Union, 1983) 265-80; WB Creighton, 
WJ Ford and RJ Mitchell, Labour Law: Text and Materials, 2nd ed (Law Book Company, 1993) 833-40. 
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Bans clauses were abolished by the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 1996 (WROLA Act).  
3.2 The Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act (No 3) 1977  
Not only did the C&A Act lack any definition of strike or lockout after 1930, it also lacked 
any definition of ‘industrial action’, despite the fact that it contained many provisions that 
were clearly directed at the proscription of many of the behaviours encompassed by that term. 
That changed in 1977, when the Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act (No 3) 
1977 (1977 Act) for the first time introduced a definition of ‘industrial action’ in federal law: 
 
‘Industrial action’ means – 
(a) the performance of work (being work the terms and conditions of which are prescribed wholly or partly 
by an award of the [Australian Conciliation and Arbitration] Commission…) in a manner different 
from that in which it is customarily performed, or the adoption of a practice in relation to such work, 
the result of which is a restriction or limitation on, or delay in, the performance of work; 
(b) a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work, or on acceptance or offering for work, in 
accordance with the terms and conditions prescribed by an award of the Commission…or 
(c) a failure or refusal by persons to attend for work or a failure or refusal to perform any work at all by 
persons who attend for work, 
but does not include the performance of work in a manner, the adoption of a practice, ban, limitation or 
restriction, or a failure or refusal, which is authorised by the employer of the persons concerned.23  
The 1977 amendments were introduced some 15 years before the start of the formal shift 
away from conciliation and arbitration towards enterprise bargaining. They were not, 
therefore, concerned with protecting workers and unions against common law or statutory 
liability in respect of industrial action. Instead, they were concerned with enforcing the norms 
of the system through provisions enabling the balloting of union members in relation to 
proposed industrial action,24 or the deregistration of trade unions who took industrial action in 
certain circumstances.25 They were also concerned with protecting individuals who did not 
wish to join, or participate in the activities of, trade unions.26  
The 1977 definition of industrial action provided the basis for the definitions of that term 
in all subsequent iterations of the federal industrial statute, including s 19 of the FW Act.27  
Since 1993, however, these definitions have, to a significant degree, been concerned with 
determining the scope of statutory protection against common law liability in respect of 
industrial action, as well as fixing unions and their members with liability for the kinds of 
activities that were the focus of the 1977 amendments. In addition, the updated versions of 
the 1977 definition have been used since 1996 to proscribe industrial action that does not fall 
within the statutory protections. Despite these important changes of purpose, the statutory 
                                                            
23 C&A Act s 4, as amended by s 3 of the 1977 Act. 
24 C&A Act s 45.  
25 C&A Act s 143(1)(j).  
26 C&A Act ss 5(1)(aa), 132A, 144A. See further Phillipa Weeks, Trade Union Security Law (Federation Press, 
1996) 178 – 188; Creighton et al, above n 22, 1081-89. 
27 Section 7(1) of the Building and Construction Industry (Improving Productivity) Act 2016 (Cth) (BCIIP Act) 
defines ‘industrial action’ for purposes of that Act in terms which are effectively identical to the definition in s 
19(1) of the FW Act.     
8 
 
definition has remained essentially unchanged for some 40 years. That being the case, it is 
not entirely surprising that it should now be found wanting.  
4. Section 19 
4.1 The core concept 
Section 19 of the FW Act states: 
(1) Industrial action means action of any of the following kinds: 
(a) the performance of work by an employee in a manner different from that in which it is customarily 
performed, or the adoption of a practice in relation to work by an employee, the result of which is 
a restriction or limitation on, or a delay in, the performance of the work; 
(b) a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work by an employee or on the acceptance of 
or offering for work by an employee; 
(c)  a failure or refusal by employees to attend for work or a failure or refusal to perform any work at 
all by employees who attend for work; 
(d) the lockout of employees from their employment by the employer of the employees. 
Note: In Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v The 
Age Company Limited, PR946290, the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission considered the nature of industrial action and noted that action will not be industrial 
in character if it stands completely outside the area of disputation and bargaining.  
(2)  However, industrial action does not include the following: 
(a)  action by employees that is authorised or agreed to by the employer of the employees; 
(b) action by an employer that is authorised or agreed to by, or on behalf of, employees of the 
employer; 
(c)  action by an employee if: 
(i) the action was based on a reasonable concern of the employee about an imminent risk to 
his or her health and safety; and 
(ii) the employee did not unreasonably fail to comply with a direction of his or her employer 
to perform other available work, whether at the same or another workplace, that was safe 
and appropriate for the employee to perform. 
(3)  An employer locks out employees from their employment if the employer prevents the employees 
from performing work under their contracts of employment without terminating those contracts. 
Self-evidently, this definition is very similar to that in the 1977 Act. The most 
significant differences relate to: the scope of the exclusions in s 19(2); the inclusion of a 
definition of ‘lockout’ in s 19(3); and the inclusion in s 19(1)(a) and (b) of reference to work 
‘performed by an employee’ rather than to work regulated by an award as in the 1977 
definition. 
4.2 The significance of the definition  
As indicated at the outset, the definition of industrial action in s 19 is of critical significance 
in relation to four principal issues. 
4.2.1 Protected industrial action 
Section 408 of the FW Act identifies three forms of protected industrial action: employee 
claim action, employee response action, and employer response action. To be protected, all 
such action must be ‘for a proposed enterprise agreement’. It must also meet a set of 
‘common requirements’ set out in s 413. Furthermore, before there can be any question of 
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taking protected industrial action, the proposed action must have been approved in a ballot 
conducted in accordance with Division 8 of Part 3-3.28  
If the preconditions are satisfied, then s 415 has the effect that ‘no action lies under 
any law (whether written or unwritten) in force in a State or Territory in relation to any 
industrial action that is protected industrial action’, subject to the qualification that protection 
will not extend to any action involving: personal injury; wilful or reckless destruction of, or 
damage to, property; the unlawful taking, keeping or use of property; or defamation that 
occurs in the course of the industrial action. 
The fact that industrial action is protected has a number of important consequences 
for individual participants. Quite apart from the protection against common law or statutory 
liability in s 415, it is clear from s 347(1)(b)(iii) that organising or participating in protected 
industrial action constitutes ‘industrial activity’ for purposes of Division 4 of Part 3-1, with 
the consequence that the individual is protected against ‘adverse action’ because of their 
having organised or participated in the protected industrial action.29 
An employee who is dismissed for participating in unprotected industrial action 
cannot access the protections in Part 3-1 of the FW Act, but might still be able to challenge 
the fairness of their dismissal under the unfair dismissal provisions in Part 3-2 of that Act.30 
4.2.2 Unprotected industrial action  
As noted earlier, for all practical purposes, all industrial action which is not subject to 
statutory protection is unlawful at common law as either or both of a tort or breach of 
contract.  
Under the FW Act, the statutory proscriptions are narrower than in the past. 
Nevertheless, they do include: a prohibition on organising or engaging in industrial action 
during the nominal life of an enterprise agreement (s 417);31 provision enabling the FWC to 
make orders that unprotected industrial action which is happening, is threatened, impending 
or probable, or is being organised stop, not occur or not be organised (s 418);32 and the 
availability of injunctions to restrain or stop industrial action where a bargaining 
representative is engaging in pattern bargaining (s 422).33 
4.2.3 Payment of wages during industrial action 
                                                            
28 The authors’ interest in the broader definitional issues addressed in this article emerged in the context of a 
detailed study of the operation of these ballot provisions which is being undertaken together with Richard 
Johnstone of QUT. This research is funded by the ARC – ARC DP140100902. For detailed discussion of the 
ballot provisions see Breen Creighton, Catrina Denvir and Shae McCrystal, ‘Strike ballots and the law in 
Australia’ (2016) 29 Australian Journal of Labour Law 154. 
29 FW Act ss 346(b) and 342(1) Table, item 1.  
30 See further Stewart et al, above n 2, [26.72]. 
31 When read with s 545, this section provides for the issue of injunctions, making of orders for compensation, 
orders of reinstatement and/or the imposition of penalties in respect of breaches of the prohibition. 
32 Failure to comply with such an order is enforceable by means of injunction in the Federal Circuit Court or 
Federal Court. 
33 This provision appears to be entirely unused in practice, see Stewart et al, above n 2, 934-5. 
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Workers normally take industrial action to exert pressure on an employer with whom they are 
in dispute. To be effective, the action must inflict ‘pain’ upon the employer – for example in 
consequence of their being unable to supply goods or services to their clients or customers. It 
is generally accepted that workers must share in the pain, in particular by not receiving wages 
or salary whilst participating in industrial action.  
Subject to one exception, the FW Act does not allow for the payment of wages in 
respect of periods of industrial action.34 This is reflected in Division 9 of Part 3-3, which 
makes almost obsessively detailed provision to prevent workers from seeking, receiving or 
accepting payment in relation to any period when they are taking industrial action – protected 
or otherwise.35 The solitary exception is where protected industrial action takes the form of a 
partial work ban, in which circumstances the employer may, but is not obliged, to withhold 
all or part of an employee’s wages, or to refuse to accept part-performance from the 
employee. 36  It should also be noted that an employer can quite properly pay wages to 
employees in circumstances where they have engaged in conduct which would constitute 
‘industrial action’ but for the fact that the employer has ‘agreed’ to that action in accordance 
with s 19(2)(a).37 
4.2.2 Stand down of employees 
In some circumstances, employers who are not directly involved in an industrial 
dispute may find that their business is disrupted by such action to the point where they cannot 
usefully deploy their workforce – for example because of a disruption in the supply chain. 
Section 524(1)(a) of the FW Act addresses this possibility by enabling employers to stand 
down their employees in such circumstances – provided the industrial action is not organised 
or engaged in by the employer.38 Section 524(3), meanwhile, provides that when a worker is 
stood down in reliance upon s 524(1) ‘the employer is not required to make payments to the 
employee’ for the period of the stand down. 
If, as is commonly the case, an enterprise agreement makes provision for the standing 
down of employees in the event of industrial action, then the employer cannot stand down in 
reliance upon s 524(1), but can, of course, stand its employees down in accordance with the 
agreement.39          
5. Industrial action under s 19 
 
                                                            
34 See further Stewart et al, above n 2, [26.58]-[26.69]. 
35 Note also that the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) provides for disqualification from receipt of social security 
benefits for persons whose employment is interrupted by their participation in industrial action. See, eg, ss 
500C, 553A, 596, 660XBE, 729AA, 759 and 771HB. For an example of the practical application of the 
forerunners of these provisions, see Savage v Director General of Social Services 1983 AILR 525. 
36 FW Act ss 471-472. 
37 See further text accompanying n 113. 
38 Note that s 524(1)(b) and (c) provides for stand down in circumstances which are not industrial action-related. 
39 FW Act s 524(2). On occasion, a contract of employment may provide for stand down in the face of industrial 
action, in which case the same principles will apply. See further Stewart et al, above n 2, [15.56]. 
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This section of the article consists of an examination of s 19(1) to ascertain exactly 
what is, and what is not, industrial action under the FW Act. Action constituting a strike is 
considered first, followed by action falling short of strike, notably work bans and the 
performance of work in a manner different from that in which it is customarily performed.  
 
5.1 Strikes  
It will be recalled that s 19(1)(c) provides that industrial action includes both ‘a failure 
or refusal by employees to attend for work’ and ‘a failure or refusal to perform any work at 
all by employees who attend for work’. 
This is entirely consistent with the dictionary definition of a strike as ‘a concerted 
stopping of work or withdrawal of workers’ services’. As such, it raises few difficulties in 
practice: it is normally a fairly straightforward question of fact whether workers have failed 
to attend for work, or have refused to perform any work having first attended for work. More 
problematic in both conceptual and practical terms are the attempts in s 19(1)(a) and (b) to 
capture action that does not involve a refusal to attend for, or perform, work. 
5.2 Industrial action short of a strike 
5.2.1 Section 19(1)(b) 
Section 19(1)(b) contemplates ‘a ban, limitation or restriction’ on the performance of work, 
or on the ‘acceptance of or offering for work’, by an employee. There are, therefore, two 
limbs to this definition: the first contemplates a ban etc on the actual performance of work, 
whereas the second contemplates a refusal to offer for work or to accept work when offered. 
Clearly, there is some overlap between the second limb of para (b) and refusal to attend for, 
or perform, work as contemplated by para (c) discussed above. Paragraph (b) does, however, 
appear to be rather wider in that it does not seem to require that there actually be a stoppage 
of work, provided that the ban is in place.  
There has been some confusion as to the meaning of a ‘ban’ for purposes of para (b). 
This is surprising in light of the fact that, as noted earlier, the concept of a ban has been a 
significant part of the federal system of industrial regulation for many years. 
The confusion to which the use of ‘bans’ in s 19(1)(b) has given rise is illustrated by 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v 
CFMEU (Energy Australia).40 In that case the CFMEU had notified the employer that it 
proposed to impose ‘bans limiting the output of individual generators’ at a power station 
operated by Energy Australia to 240 megawatts at prescribed times of the day. The bans had 
been approved by a relevant protected industrial action ballot, but in considering the 
employer’s application for an injunction on the basis that the proposed action was not a ‘ban’ 
within the meaning of s 19(1), and therefore not protected industrial action, Hollingworth J 
agreed with the employer’s contention that ‘the word “ban” contemplates a prohibition on 
work, rather than a prescription to perform work in a certain way or to achieve a certain 
                                                            
40 [2013] VSC 105. 
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result’.41 Her Honour derived support for this conclusion from the terms of s 19(1) which 
‘draws a distinction between the concept of a ban, and the concept of performing work 
differently from the usual manner’, the latter being a component of s 19(1)(a).42 It followed, 
in Her Honour’s opinion, that the proposed industrial action was not protected under the FW 
Act, and she issued an interim injunction to restrain the CFMEU from committing the tort of 
inducing breach of contract. 
Three months later, in FWC proceedings relating to the same dispute, a Full Bench 
dismissed an appeal by Energy Australia against a refusal by Bissett C to issue a s 418 order 
to restrain the allegedly unprotected imposition of the ban on power generation.43 In the 
course of their decision the Full Bench observed: 
To achieve the limitations on output the nature of the action would be that work the operators would 
normally do or is part of their normal duties will not be done. They will not operate the generators in 
the usual manner to that normally expected of them or as may be directed. The Commissioner was not 
in error, in our opinion, in the manner in which she dealt with the meaning to be ascribed to the words 
in the notice and, in that context, the use of the word bans.44 
In reaching this conclusion the Full Bench distinguished the decision of Jessup J in 
Williams v CFMEU45 on the grounds that in that case the Court had been dealing with the 
term ‘ban, limitation or restriction’ as used in former s 36 of the BCII Act. In the course of 
his opinion in that case, Jessup J cited with approval observations by Kirby J in Re Metal 
Trades Award 1952; Commonwealth Steel Co Ltd v Federated Ironworkers’ Association of 
Australia to the effect that the term ‘ban’ refers to ‘a total prohibition of all of the work 
described’ and that the words ‘limitation or restriction’ were intended to ‘catch any lesser 
interference’.46 Jessup J went on to add that the concept of a ban ‘involves a prohibition 
which is absolute or categorical, and not merely a matter of inclination or preference’.47  
The difference between the approach adopted by Jessup J in Williams and the Full 
Bench in Energy Australia is perhaps more apparent than real. In Jessup J’s terms, to 
constitute a ‘ban’ for purposes of the then BCII Act, and by inference s 19 of the FW Act, the 
notified ban had to be ‘total’. It was. It did not need to be a ban on all output, just output 
beyond the cut off prescribed in the notice, and during the hours notified. That being the case, 
the earlier decision of Hollingworth J appears, with respect, to be incorrect.  
The ban issue aside, the concept of ‘ban, limitation or restriction’ is largely 
unproblematic. It has, for example, been found to encompass bans on working to new rosters 
which had (validly) been put in place by the employer;48 refusing to pump oil out of a ‘Back 
Acter Pedestal’ on-board a ship on unfounded occupational health and safety grounds;49 and 
                                                            
41 Ibid, [35]. See also Ambulance Victoria v United Voice [2014] FCA 1119, [25]. 
42 Ibid, [36]. 
43 Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2013] FWCFB 3793. 
44 Ibid, [65]. 
45 [2009] FCA 223. 
46 (1952) 74 CAR 84, 94. 
47 [2009] FCA 223, [90]. 
48 CEPU v Australian Postal Commission [2010] FMCA 688, [109]. 
49 Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd v MUA [2010] FWA 5196. 
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refusal to work reasonable overtime in accordance with a relevant enterprise agreement or an 
applicable contractual arrangement.50  
 
On the other hand, the definition has been found not to extend to giving notice of an intention 
to take industrial action on a particular day and then turning up for work on the day in 
question – so-called ‘aborted industrial action’.51 As appears below, in David’s Distribution Pty 
Ltd v National Union of Workers (David’s Distribution) it was also found not to extend to at least 
some, possibly all, forms of picketing activity.52  
 
5.2.2 Section 19(1)(a) 
 
The interpretation of s 19(1)(a) raises rather more difficult issues. It will be recalled that to 
fall within the scope of that paragraph either: 
• work must be performed in a manner different from that in which it is customarily or 
normally performed; or 
• those taking the action must adopt a practice in relation to the work  
 such that the result is a restriction or limitation on, or a delay in the performance of work. 
 For conduct to fall within the scope of this definition, therefore, it is not enough to 
show that work is performed in a manner different from that in which it is customarily or 
normally performed, or that a practice has been adopted in relation to the work. It must also 
be shown that the requisite conduct has resulted in a restriction, limitation or delay in the 
performance of that work. 
 This form of words is clearly the linear descendent of para (a) of the definition of 
industrial action which was inserted in the C&A Act in 1977, and has been a source of some 
difficulty for courts and tribunals which have been called upon to apply it since that time. 
 These difficulties are neatly encapsulated in the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Mornington Peninsula Shire Council (Mornington),53 and by the judgment of Tracey J in 
Ambulance Victoria v United Voice (Ambulance Victoria).54  
 In Mornington the Australian Nursing Federation (ANF) had applied for a PABO in 
respect of certain forms of proposed industrial action, including at paragraph 5 of the 
application, authorisation for ‘distributing information to clients, and the media about the 
reason for the industrial action, and the wearing of campaign clothing’. Vice President 
Lawler granted the ANF’s application. 
                                                            
50 DP World Australia Ltd v MUA [2007] AIRC 646; AWU v Bluescope Steel Ltd [2008] AIRCFB 24; Pacific 
National Pty Ltd v Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union [2010] FWA 2884; Patrick Stevedores 
Holdings Pty Ltd v MUA [2015] FWC 3587 – cf CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25. 
51 Re Boral Resources (NSW) Pty Ltd [2010] FWAFB 1771, [10]. See further Stewart et al, above n 2, [27.16]. 
52 (1999) 91 FCR 463. 
53 [2011] FWAFB 4809. 
54 [2014] FCA 1119. 
14 
 
 The employer sought, and was granted, leave to appeal against that decision. On 
appeal the Appellant acknowledged that there was no single decision dealing with 
communication to third parties as an iteration of industrial action, but submitted that ‘…the 
authorities in considering “industrial action” resulted in definitions which had at their heart a 
foundation in the performance, or non-performance of work’ and that the proposed action in 
paragraph 5 did not meet the necessary connection to the performance of work.55  
For its part, the ANF submitted that the wearing of campaign clothing was 
inconsistent with the employer’s clothing policy, and that in the absence of approval from the 
employer, wearing such clothing ‘would constitute “industrial action” within the meaning of 
s 19 of the Act’, and that the communication contemplated by Question 5 ‘would occur whilst 
employees were working and would clearly fall within the meaning of “industrial action” 
involving a restriction, limitation or delay in the performance of work’.56  
 A majority comprised of Watson SDP and Gooley C determined that the actions 
specified in Question 5 were ‘capable, depending on the circumstances, of constituting 
“industrial action” within the meaning of s 19’.57  
More specifically, according to the majority, distribution of information to clients and 
the media might involve cessation or interruption of work and as such ‘would clearly involve 
the performance of work by an employee in a manner different from that in which it is 
customarily performed’, resulting in both a delay in the performance of work for purposes of 
s 19(1)(a) and a ban, limitation or restriction for purposes of s 19(1)(b).58  
The majority also found that the wearing of campaign clothing was capable of 
constituting a ban, limitation or restriction for purposes of s 19(1)(b).59 In reaching this 
conclusion the majority observed that: 
…the term ‘the performance of work’ within s 19(1)(b) of the Act is not restricted to how the tasks 
associated with a particular job are performed. It involves, for example when work is performed, where 
work is performed, how work is performed and the conditions under which work is performed.60   
  In the course of a vigorous dissenting opinion Kaufman SDP argued that neither the 
dissemination of information nor the wearing of campaign clothing came within either s 
19(1)(a) or (b).61 
 Senior Deputy President Kaufman considered that the dissemination of information, 
even within working hours, ‘says nothing about performing the work in a manner different 
from that in which it is usually performed or the adoption of a practice in relation to work’, 
and ‘there is nothing in the nature of the proposed conduct that suggests it would result in a 
restriction or limitation on, or a delay in, the performance of work’ – although the situation 
                                                            
55 Mornington, above n 53, [14], [15]. 
56 Ibid, [17]-[18]. 
57 Ibid, [22]. 
58 Ibid, [23]. 
59 Ibid, [24]. See also [32].  
60 Ibid, [25]. See also United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy [2013] FCA 763 at [154] (per Ross J).  
61 Mornington, above n 53, [62]. 
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might have been otherwise ‘had the proposed conduct been along the lines of say, a stoppage 
of work for 5 minutes per shift or per hour in order that information might be distributed’.62 
As for s 19(1)(b), ‘the dissemination of information is clearly not a ban, limitation or 
restriction on the performance of work’ and as such did not fall within that limb of the 
definition.63 
His Honour was also not persuaded that the wearing of campaign clothing was 
capable of falling within either s 19(1)(a) or (b). As concerns s 19(1)(a), it had ‘nothing to do 
with the manner in which the work is performed, and could not affect the manner in which 
work was performed so as to result in a restriction, limitation or delay in the performance of 
work’.64 It also did not constitute a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work, 
or on offering for or accepting work for purposes of s 19(1)(b).65 
Justice Tracey in Ambulance Victoria was clearly much more comfortable with the 
position adopted by Kaufman SDP in Mornington than with that of the majority. 
In Ambulance Victoria, United Voice sought approval for industrial action which 
contemplated the release to the public of ambulance response times. The FWC made a PABO 
permitting that question to be put to ballot. The proposed action was approved by the balloted 
employees, and in due course United Voice served notice on the employer that it proposed to 
release data to the media as contemplated by the ballot question. As Tracey J pointed out in 
the Federal Court, doing so would clearly constitute a breach of contract on the part of the 
employees concerned.66 Following service of the notice of protected action, the employer 
sought a Federal Court injunction to restrain the action on the grounds that the proposed 
release of the data did not constitute industrial action in the relevant sense. In the course of 
his judgment, Tracey J referred extensively to Mornington, and concluded that the 
constructions of s 19(1)(a) and (b) adopted by Lawler VP, and by the majority, were ‘too 
broadly stated’.67   
His Honour gave a number of reasons for reaching that conclusion. The first was that 
the ‘work’ referred to in s 19 was not ‘work’ generally – rather the definition referred to work 
performed by ‘an employee who is taking the relevant action’. 68  In support of this 
proposition, he referred to the decision of the Full Court in David’s Distribution and to the 
fact that Work Choices inserted the words ‘by an employee’ in what are now s 19(1)(a) and 
(b).69 
In the opinion of Tracey J, the use of this terminology means that: 
                                                            
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, [63]. 
64 Ibid, [64]. 
65 Ibid, [65]. 
66 Ambulance Victoria, above n 54, [5]. 
67 Ibid, [19]. 
68 Ibid, [20]. 
69 Ibid, [22]. See also CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd, above n 50, [141]. 
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It is…necessary to identify work normally performed by the relevant employees and the manner in 
which it is customarily performed. The duties of the managers include the collection and analysis of 
information relating to response times of ambulances in their areas. It is not part of their duties to 
provide such information to persons outside ambulance Victoria, including reporters and others 
engaged by media outlets. It cannot, in my opinion, be said that making response time data available to 
the media, in breach of their contracts of employment, involves the performance of their normal work 
in a manner different from that in which it is customarily performed…The fact that the proposed action 
is contrary to contractual terms which are binding on the employees does not, for that reason, amount 
to the performance of duty in a manner different from the norm. Rules, policies and contractual 
provisions which proscribe conduct of certain kinds by employees regulate the conduct of those 
employees in the course of their employment. They do not impinge directly on the manner in which 
work is performed. A breach of such a proscription cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as a departure 
from the customary manner of performance of an employee’s work. Were it otherwise, contraventions 
by employees of policies which prohibit sexual harassment or discrimination of various kinds could be 
regarded as departures from the customary manner of performance of work and thereby amount to 
industrial action.70 
His Honour was confirmed in this view by the fact that the proposed action in this case: 
…cannot in any relevant sense, be said to result in a restriction or limitation on or a delay in the 
performance of the employee’s normal duties. What is proposed is the taking of action above and 
beyond and outside the range of their normal work rather than the placing of a restriction on the 
performance of those duties.71 
Justice Tracey also agreed with Kaufman SDP in Mornington that ‘the position might 
be different were the proposed conduct to include express provision for a stoppage of work, 
even for a short period, in order for the manager to distribute data to the media’.72 In other 
words, to attract protection, it would be necessary for the employees concerned to stop work 
rather than do something which might (or might not) exert pressure on the employer without 
the dislocation involved in a work stoppage. 
With respect, this line of reasoning is not entirely convincing. First, the 
harassment/discrimination example fails to take account of the reference in the legislative 
note to s 19(1) to the decision in AMWU v The Age Company Limited73 to the effect that 
‘action will not be industrial in character if it stands completely outside the area of 
disputation and bargaining’. If, therefore, the sexual harassment/discrimination postulated by 
Tracey J fell outside the area of disputation and bargaining then it would lack the requisite 
‘industrial’ character, and would not constitute industrial action for purposes of s 19(1)(a).74 
Secondly, the approach adopted by his Honour does not seem to take adequate 
account of the fact that in the normal course of events the employees concerned would be 
performing their work in a manner which did not involve breach of their contracts of 
employment. By releasing data which they were not entitled to release they would be 
breaching their contract, and as such they would not be performing work in the manner in 
                                                            
70 Ambulance Victoria, above n 54, [23]. 
71 Ibid, [24]. 
72 Ibid. 
73 PR946290, 11 May 2004. See further n 103 below. 
74 Note, however, that strictly speaking the passage referred to in the legislative note is obiter, see text 
accompanying n 105 below. 
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which it is customarily performed. This would be even more evident if it is assumed that the 
employees were given an express direction not to release the data, and they went ahead and 
did so in the face of a lawful reasonable direction not to do so. 
Justice Tracey appears to be on firmer ground in finding that if the data were released 
there would be no restriction, limitation or delay in the performance of the employees’ 
normal duties.  
It will be recalled that in Mornington, the ANF argued that the communication 
contemplated by the PABO application would occur whilst employees were working and as 
such would involve a restriction, limitation or delay in the performance of work. The majority 
appears to have accepted this proposition, but did not set out their reasons for doing so. With 
respect, the proposition is not self-evident. If the release of the data in either Mornington or 
Ambulance Victoria would not involve any stoppage of work on the part of the employees 
concerned, and would not delay the performance of their normal duties, then it is hard to see 
how it could be said to constitute a restriction, limitation or delay for purposes of s 19(1)(a), 
even accepting that it constituted the performance of work in a manner different from that in 
which it was customarily performed. 
Whatever conceptual difficulties may arise from the wording of section 19(1)(a), 
unions have exercised considerable ingenuity in adopting novel practices in relation to work 
or devising ways of performing work in a manner different from the way in which it is 
customarily performed, even though the link to restriction, limitation etc, or delay may 
sometimes seem somewhat tenuous.  
For example, in ASU v Lend Lease Bissett C was prepared to make a PABO seeking 
authorisation for: 
• ‘attaching, incorporating or distributing’ campaign related material to outgoing 
correspondence and to the employer’s materials and displays; 
• ‘wearing, distributing and posting union campaign material such as t-shirts, badges, 
written communications and stickers in support of the proposed enterprise 
agreement’; 
• not responding to non-emergency emails until after 1.00 PM each day, and placing an 
out of office notice indicating that the employee concerned was taking industrial 
action; 
• adopting a similar course in relation to voice mails; and 
• ‘writing messages representing the concerns of Lend Lease staff regarding the EBA 
negotiations and process on Lend Lease…vehicles’.75 
The fact that a particular form of action is included in a PABO application does not 
mean that, even if approved in a ballot, the action will necessarily fall within the definition of 
industrial action in s 19(1).76 In the Lend Lease case, for example, while all proposed forms 
                                                            
75 [2014] FWC 5676, [17]. 
76 See eg Ambulance Victoria, above n 54, per Tracey J at [27]. 
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of action appeared to involve the performance of work differently from the manner in which 
it was customarily performed, only the third and fourth proposed actions clearly involved a 
‘restriction’ or ‘limitation’ on the actual performance of work.  
 Other examples of ‘exotic’ forms of action, some of which have been included in 
PABO applications, but which would not necessarily constitute industrial action for purposes 
of s 19 include: 
• airline pilots wearing red ties rather than company-issued ties while on duty;77 
• making announcements relating to industrial negotiations via aircraft communication 
systems;78  
• refusal to participate in firm-related events outside working hours;79 
• bans on saluting by firefighters;80 
• responding to emails with the caps lock function turned on;81  
• consuming meals and drinks during rest breaks in unoccupied management offices;82 
and 
• under cover of darkness, cutting the perimeter fence of a construction site and 
strewing lettuce leaves around the gaps in the fence in a partially successful attempt to 
induce feral kangaroos to enter the site.83  
It must clearly be open to question whether some or all of these forms of action would be 
capable of having the result of a ‘restriction or limitation’ on the performance of work in the 
requisite sense. 
5.3 The strange case of picketing 
 
It was noted earlier that picketing is a significant feature of many industrial disputes. 
Theoretically, picketing would be lawful if it consisted of nothing more than attending at 
premises and peacefully communicating information, and as such would not require statutory 
protection. There is, however, authority which suggests that picketing is inherently 
unlawful,84 and in any event, even peaceful picketing will almost inevitably involve the torts 
of nuisance and trespass. If, as would often be the case, picketing involves interference with 
the movement of goods, services or people then it would inevitably involve further forms of 
tortious behaviour, and in some instances give rise to criminal liability, especially if violence 
                                                            
77 AIPA v FWA (2012) 201 FCR 200, [47]. 
78 Ibid. 
79 ASU v Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd [2016] FWC 4740. 
80 UFUA v CFA, PR569907, 29 July 2015. 
81 Ibid. 
82 ASU v Central Highlands Water, PR576164, 18 January 2016. 
83 Mortimore v CFMEU [2010] FCA 537, [14]. This case arose out of an application for injunctive relief under s 
39 of the BCII Act, but the definition of ‘building industrial action’ under that Act was relevantly the same as 
that in s 19 of the FW Act. See also Alfred v CFMEU [2011] FCA 556; Alfred v CFMEU [2011] FCA 557.  
84 See J Lyons & Sons v Wilkins [1899] Ch 255; Re Van der Lubbe (1949) 49 SR(NSW) 309; Sid Ross Agency 
Pty Ltd v Actors and Announcers Equity [1971] NSWLR 760. Cf Ward lock & Co Ltd v Operative printers 
Assistants Society (1906) 22 TLR 327; CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243 at [58], [72] where 
the High Court characterised a particular picket as a ‘lawful protest’.  
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or damage to property was involved.85 That being the case, it may be assumed that respect for 
the right to strike requires that picketing activity should be protected against civil and 
criminal liability – at least so long as it remains peaceful. As noted earlier, that is certainly 
the position which has been taken by the supervisory bodies of the ILO.86 
It has been determined, however, that that is not the position that has been adopted by 
the Australian Parliament. 
In CFMEU v AIRC the Full Court of the Federal Court had significant doubts as to 
whether picketing could properly be regarded as industrial action within the definition of that 
term as it then stood, although it was not called upon to express a decided view on the matter 
at that time.87       
In the following year, in David’s Distribution, a differently constituted Full Bench did 
need to express a decided view as to whether picketing fell within the definition of industrial 
action in the WR Act. Justices Wilcox and Cooper (with whom Burchett J relevantly agreed) 
started from the proposition that picketing which does not involve ‘obstruction and besetting’ 
did not fall within the definition of industrial action by reason of the fact that ‘it does not 
relate to the performance of work in the circumstances specified in…the definition’. 
According to the plurality, such conduct did not need protection ‘because it is not actionable 
by anyone’.88  
Turning to picketing which does involve obstruction and besetting, and which in 
consequence would require protection, Wilcox and Cooper JJ noted that: 
Picketing which interferes with a person’s liberty and freedom of movement infringes that person’s 
common law rights; in particular, the right to free passage in public places and on public roads and 
footpaths…There is a presumption in the interpretation of statutes that there is no intention to interfere 
with common law rights or basic common law doctrine unless the words of the statute expressly or 
necessarily require that result… 
To interpret para (c) of the definition of ‘industrial action’ in such a way as to include picketing 
infringing upon the rights and freedoms of others, would be to confer statutory immunity on such 
conduct; provided only it was engaged in upon proper notice to the employer and for the purposes of 
negotiating a certified agreement or an AWA. It would authorise interference with the rights, not only 
of the employer, but also of other affected persons who, but for the immunity, would have a right of 
action at common law…89  
 
It will be recalled that at the time David’s Distribution was decided, the definition of 
industrial action did not make any express reference to whether industrial action had to be 
taken by employees of the employer who was the target of the action. This meant that if 
picketing involved persons who were not employees of the target employer the action could, 
in principle, still fall within the scope of para (c) of the then-current definition of industrial 
action. This definition was amended by Work Choices to make clear that to constitute 
                                                            
85 See further Creighton et al, above n 22, ch 36; McCrystal, above n 5, 99-101; Stewart et al, above n 2, [26.41-
26.44] and [26.88].  
86 Text accompanying n 13, above. 
87 (1998) 84 IR 314, 324-25. 
88 (1999) 91 IR 198, [71]. See also [52]. 
89 Ibid, [72]-[73].  
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industrial action, the action had to be engaged in by the employees of the employer 
concerned. In other words, there was no longer any possibility that action by a third party (for 
example a truck driver engaged by a supplier who refused to cross a picket line to make 
deliveries) could constitute a ban, limitation or restriction in the relevant sense.90  
The logical consequence of the decision in David’s Distribution is that employees 
who picket their own place of work in the context of an industrial dispute are not protected 
against common law liability in respect of that picketing activity, even though they would be 
protected against liability in respect of any tortious conduct associated with other aspects of 
the industrial action – such as refusing to work or performing only part of their normal work. 
It also means that a truck driver who refused to cross a picket line would not be protected 
against common law liability deriving from that refusal – for example for breach of their 
contract of employment or the tort of conspiracy. And it means that workers from other 
workplaces who joined a picket line to show solidarity with their fellow workers would have 
no protection against civil or criminal liability, even if the picket was entirely peaceful. 
Of course the fact that picketing does not constitute industrial action also means that 
such activity could not be constrained by orders under s 418 of the FW Act, and its 
predecessors. This exclusion is, however, likely to be of only marginal comfort to employees 
and unions in light of the fact that an employer that was targeted by pickets who engaged in 
conduct which went beyond the communication of information would have ready access to 
relief under common law and legislative provisions such as ss 45D-45DA of the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010, not to mention the anti-coercion provisions in s 343 of the FW 
Act.91 Furthermore, there have been a number of instances where courts and tribunals have 
been prepared to make orders under s 418 and its predecessors even though the activity that 
was constrained consisted of picketing, and on the reasoning in David’s Distribution was not 
industrial action. 92  The fact remains, however, that David’s Distribution has not been 
overruled, and unless or until that happens it must be regarded as good law.93 
In 2015 the Heydon Commission recommended that the FW Act be amended so that 
picketing should be treated as industrial action for purposes of making orders under s 418.94 
Interestingly, as Stewart et al point out, the Commission’s Report did not contain any 
                                                            
90 See, eg, Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v CFMEU [2014] FCA 1373.  
91 See, eg, Co-Operative Bulk Handling Ltd v MUA [2013] FCA 940; Williams v AMWU (No 2) [2009] FCA 
103 (involving the relevantly identical provision in s 44 of the BCII Act).  
92 See, eg, Transfield Construction v AMWU [2002] FCA 1413; CEPU v Australian Postal Corporation, Federal 
Court of Australia (Finkelstein J), V137 of 2004, 26 February 2004; Saint-Gobain Warehousing Pty Ltd v NUW 
[2006] NSWSC 1210, [11]. In Mortimore v CFMEU [2010] FCA 537 Tracey J was prepared at least to 
countenance the possibility that picketing could constitute building industrial action (at [16]-[17]).  
93 See Williams v AMWU (No 2) [2009] FCA 103. Note in particular Jessup J’s discussion at [34]-[35] of the 
decision of Kenny J in Cahill v CFMEU [2008] FCA 1292, and his rejection of the suggestion that that case had 
distinguished David’s Distribution. See also Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v CFMEU 
[2014] FCA 1373. 
94 Royal Commission on Trade Union Governance and Corruption, Report, Vol 5, Commonwealth, Canberra, 
2015, [190] and Recommendation 66(b). 
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discussion of whether picketing in the context of otherwise protected industrial action should 
itself be protected.95    
5.4 Employer industrial action/Lockouts 
Section 19(1)(d) provides for just one form of employer industrial action, the lockout of 
employees from their employment by their employer, whilst s 19(3) defines lockout for this 
purpose in terms of an employer preventing its employees ‘from performing work under their 
contracts of employment without terminating those contracts’. 
From 1993 onwards federal industrial legislation recognised that it was lawful for 
employers to lock out employees in the course of enterprise bargaining.96 It was not until the 
Work Choices amendments of 2005, however, that the definition of industrial action 
contained an express differentiation between industrial action by employees and employers.97 
This suggested that prior to Work Choices, action by an employer which constituted a ‘ban 
restriction or limitation’ on the work to be performed by employees could constitute 
‘industrial action’ which, amongst other things could be protected under Division 8 of Part 
VIB of the WR Act, and could be ‘prevented’ in accordance with s 127. Clearly the concept 
of a ‘ban’ would include a lockout, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the terms 
‘restriction’ and ‘limitation’ could encompass action falling short of a ban/lockout.98 
Since 2009 the only form of employer industrial action contemplated by the federal 
Act has been the lockout. Clearly, this includes a full lockout where the employer denies 
employees the opportunity to perform work under their contracts of employment without 
those contracts being terminated.  
The application of the definition to forms of employer conduct short of a full lockout 
is, more difficult. In particular, it is not clear whether the employer’s preventing employees 
from working has to be total.  
In AMWU v Fletcher International Exports Pty Ltd (Fletcher),99 McDonald C found 
that the employer’s alleged ban on rostering workers for voluntary overtime if they had 
engaged in protected industrial action was capable of constituting a lockout within the 
meaning of s 19(3). In reaching this conclusion, McDonald C relied on observations of 
Goldberg J in CFMEU v Master Builders’ Association of Victoria (No 2)100 to the effect that 
                                                            
95 Stewart et al, above n 2, [26.26]. Section 47 of the BCIIP Act does, however, proscribe ‘unlawful picketing’ 
in the building and construction industry.  
96 See, eg, IR Act ss 170PG(3)-(6) and 170PI (2). Section 170PG(4) provided that the reference in s 170PG(3) to 
locking out employees was ‘a reference to the employer preventing employees from performing work under 
their contracts of employment without terminating those contracts’.    
97 WR Act s 420(3). 
98 See, eg, Australian Airline Flight Engineers’ Association v Qantas Airways Ltd (1998) AIRC PRQ4688 (7 
August 2008); Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Kendall Airlines (Australia) Pty Ltd (2002) AIRC 
PR920361. 
99 [2013] FWC 7752. 
100 (2000) 96 IR 274. 
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‘the imposition of a lockout allows an employer to limit or restrict the amount of work it will 
allow its employees to undertake’.101  
The approach taken by McDonald C purports to recognise a ‘ban, restriction or 
limitation on the performance of work’ as a ‘lockout’ under s 19(3). With respect, this 
interpretation does not accord with either the letter or the spirit of the FW Act. It must surely 
be the case that if the legislature had intended that employer conduct consisting of a ban, 
restriction or limitation on the performance of work was to fall within the scope of s 19(3) it 
would have said so in express terms. In light of the fact that the FW Act draws a clear 
distinction between the various forms of employee conduct falling short of withdrawal of 
labour that is encompassed by s 19(1) and the employer’s (undefined) right to lockout in s 
19(3), it strains credulity to suggest that ‘lockout’ could encompass ‘bans’ or work 
restrictions falling short of a full lockout. 
As with employee action which falls outside the statutory definition of industrial 
action, employer action which falls outside the scope of that definition could not be subject to 
the making of orders under ss 417 or 418 of the FW Act. Nevertheless, in principle it could 
constitute a breach of contract on the part of the employer, and conceivably could constitute 
‘coercion’ for purposes of ss 343 or 348 of the FW Act. The authors are not aware of any 
case where the coercion point has been taken by an employee or a union.  
The difference between the range of action available to employees and employers in s 
19(1) was noted by the Productivity Commission in its 2015 inquiry into the workplace 
relations framework, and led the Commission to recommend the adoption of a broader 
concept of employer industrial action, including permitting more graduated forms of action, 
at least in the context of responding to employee industrial action.102   
5.5 The legislative note to s 19(1) 
As indicated earlier, a legislative note to s 19(1) refers to a passage in the decision of a Full 
Bench of the AIRC in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union v The Age Company Limited to the effect that: 
It seems to us likely that the legislature did not intend to include conduct which stands completely 
outside the area of disputation and bargaining and that accordingly the definition should be read giving 
some weight to the word industrial. But precisely how far this qualification might extend is a question 
of degree. We do not think it is desirable that we go further than is necessary to decide this case.103  
‘This case’ involved an appeal by The Age Company against a s 127 order made by 
Whelan C directing it ‘to cease and desist from engaging in or threatening to engage in 
industrial action’ by terminating the employment of a specified category of employees by 
reason of redundancy. The proposed terminations arose in the context of the closure of a print 
facility in Melbourne, and the transfer of work to a new facility located close to Tullamarine 
                                                            
101 Ibid, 284.  
102 See Productivity Commission, Workplace Relations Framework, Inquiry Report No 76, Productivity 
Commission, Canberra, 2015, 896-99. 
103 Reported as The Age Company Ltd v CEPU (2004) 133 IR 197, [46].  
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Airport. Commissioner Whelan considered that the proposed terminations were ‘both a ban 
on the performance of work by them [employees at the Spencer St facility] and a restriction 
on their ability to perform work in accordance with the enterprise agreement which governs 
their employment’ within the meaning of paras (b) and (c) of the definition of industrial 
action as it then stood.104  
The Full Bench rejected this line of reasoning. It gave three principal reasons for 
doing so: 
• first, ‘it would put undue strain on the language’ to construe the definition of 
industrial action as meaning that conduct which brings employment to an end is 
industrial action. The concept of termination of employment is not the same thing as a 
‘ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work’; 
• secondly, if the legislature had intended that the definition was to include termination 
of employment it would have said so in express terms; and  
• thirdly, because ‘the operation of the definition is predicated on the existence of an 
employment relationship or relationships pursuant to which various obligations are 
owed by each party to the other’.105 
 These grounds were sufficient to dispose of the case. It was not strictly necessary, 
therefore, for the Full Bench to go on to suggest that it was likely that the legislature did not 
intend that conduct ‘which stands completely outside the area of disputation and bargaining’ 
should constitute industrial action for purposes of the WR Act. Strictly speaking, therefore, 
these observations were obiter dicta.  
 Furthermore, even on their own terms, the Full Bench’s observations did not state that 
‘action will not be industrial in character if it stands completely outside the area of 
disputation and bargaining’. As pointed out by Deegan C in Australian Capital Territory v 
AEU the Note ‘tends to overstate the purport of the remarks made by the Full Bench, 
particularly given the context in which those remarks were made’.106 Commissioner Deegan 
also pointed to the fact that the Full Bench had expressly stated that the extent of the 
‘industrial’ qualifier ‘is a question of degree’.107 
 The Full Bench had clearly recognised that the concept of industrial action needed to 
be sufficiently flexible to accommodate some conduct which might not be strictly ‘industrial’ 
in character. To find otherwise would, for example, mean that action which was politically 
motivated would not be susceptible to the making orders under s 127 and its successors.108 
It should also be noted that for ‘employee claim action’ to be protected under the FW 
Act it must be ‘organised or engaged in for the purpose of supporting or advancing claims’ in 
                                                            
104 AMWU v The Age Company Limited, PR944259, 9 March 2004, [83].  
105 (2004) 133 IR, [33], [34], [35] respectively. 
106 [2010] FWA 3454, [31]. 
107 The expansive approach to the obiter comments in The Age Case is also supported by the Explanatory 
Memorandum for the Fair Work Bill 2008, [90]. 
108 See, eg, CEPU v Laing (1998) 89 FCR 17; Secretary, Department of Education & Early Childhood 
Development (Victoria) v AEU [2010] FWA 3775.  
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relation to a proposed enterprise agreement, and that ‘employer response action’ must also be 
‘for a proposed enterprise agreement’.109 Since an enterprise agreement can be about only the 
permitted matters in s 172(1) of the FW Act – including matters pertaining to the relationship 
between an employer and its employees or an employer and a union – it follows that action 
which is not ‘industrial’ in character (because it does not pertain to the relationship between 
an employer and its employees and/or their union) could not be protected in any event. 
However, if action fell within the broader notion of ‘industrial action’ contemplated by 
decisions such as Laing then it would still be susceptible to the making orders under s 418, as 
well, of course, as at common law. 
Overstated or not, the legislative note has been relied upon in a number of instances to 
determine that a particular course of conduct did not possess the requisite ‘industrial’ 
character. For example, in Boral Cement v AWU it was used to support a finding that refusal 
to provide urine samples in the context of a contested drugs and alcohol policy did not 
constitute industrial action for purposes of s 418.110 Meanwhile, in Police Federation of 
Australia v Chief Commissioner of Police (Victoria Police) the applicant sought a s 418 order 
to restrain Victoria Police from redeploying members of a police band who had refused to 
accept a number of options for alternative work in the context of the ‘privatisation’ of the 
band. A Full Bench of the FWC rejected the application, and in doing so, endorsed the 
reasoning in The Age Case and the legislative note.111 
 By the same token, on a number of occasions the tribunal has used the obiter 
observations in The Age Case to support a finding that a particular course of action was 
industrial in character. For example, in AWU v Bluescope Steel Ltd a Full Bench of the AIRC 
found that a co-ordinated refusal to work optional extra shifts constituted industrial action, 
even though each individual employee had the right to refuse to work an extra shift when 
requested to do so.112          
5.6 The exclusions 
5.6.1 Agreement 
Section 19(2)(a) and (b) contemplate the possibility that conduct which is agreed to by the 
other party does not constitute industrial action for purposes of either statutory protection or 
statutory proscription. This is consistent with the essential character of industrial action as 
action taken by a party (usually employees) to an industrial relationship to exert pressure on 
the other by doing, or not doing, something which disrupts the normal activities of the target 
party. If that party agrees to the conduct, then logically the action is not industrial in 
character.113 
                                                            
109 FW Act ss 409(1) and 410(1). 
110 [2012] FWAFB 350. See also CFMEU v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd [2008] AIRCFB 1159. 
111 [2014] FWCFB 2063 at [50]. 
112 [2008] AIRCFB 24. See also Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Ltd v MUA [2015] FWC 3587; MUA v Patrick 
Stevedores Holdings Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 2651 at [187]. 
113 The employer-agreement exclusion was included in the original definition in 1977, and has been retained 
ever since. The employee agreement exclusion was inserted in 1988. 
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Interestingly, the s 19 definition is entirely silent as to when or how ‘agreement’ is to 
be signified for these purposes. The fact that s 19(2)(a) and (b) are silent in relation to both 
issues leaves open the possibility that agreement could be provided after the action has 
occurred. It also leaves open the possibility that agreement could be inferred by conduct. It 
might be said, for example, that the act of paying wages in respect of a period where 
employees had been taking strike action constituted ‘agreement’ for purposes of s 19, with 
the consequence that seeking, accepting or making such payment would not be unlawful for 
purposes of Division 9 of Part 3-3.114  
The authors are not aware of any case where an employer or union has sought to rely 
upon this reading of the s 19(2)(a) and (b) exclusions. Those cases where the exclusions have 
been raised have almost without exception been concerned with applications for s 418 orders, 
where the respondent has argued that orders should not be made due to the fact that the other 
party had agreed to the alleged industrial action, either in express terms or by making an 
enterprise agreement which authorised the action in question. Unsurprisingly, given that it is 
generally the employer who is seeking the order, such arguments have enjoyed a conspicuous 
lack of success.115  
5.6.2 Workplace health and safety 
In 1996 the definition of industrial action was amended by the insertion of an 
exclusion which was essentially the same as that now set out in s 19(2)(c). Work Choices 
adopted the same approach as the 1996 amendment, except that it inserted an onus of proof 
requirement such that if a person sought to rely on what is now the s 19(2)(c)(i) exclusion 
they had the burden of proving that that exclusion applied.116 That requirement was removed 
by the FW Act. 
In its current form, the exclusion comprises four principal elements: 
• the concern actuating those who take the action must be ‘reasonable’; 
• the risk must be ‘imminent’; 
• the risk must pertain to the actor’s own health and safety, not that of a fellow-worker 
or some external person; and  
• the person taking the action must not unreasonably fail to comply with a direction of 
their employer to perform other work, whether at the same or a different workplace, 
that is safe and appropriate for the employee to perform. 
In AMWU v Rheem Australia Pty Ltd Munro J suggested that ‘the relevant industrial 
action must be based on the person taking the action having a genuine and reasonable belief 
about an imminent risk to the health and safety to that person’.117 In addition ‘the action taken 
                                                            
114 See further Stewart et al, above n 2, [26.69]. 
115 See, eg, AWU v Bluescope Steel Ltd [2008] AIRCFB 24; United Voice v Foster’s Australia Limited [2014] 
FWCFB 4104. 
116 Post-Work Choices WR Act s 420(4). 
117 PR921306, 9 April 2003, [46]. On the effect of failure to follow safety procedures, see Cahill v CFMEU 
[2008] FCA 495, [36], [38]. 
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must be proportionate to the risk’, and ‘dispute settlement procedures relevant to safety 
disputes at the site must have been fully complied with’.118   
For a risk to be imminent ‘there must be a probability of injury or harm occurring’.119 
That in turn requires that ‘there exists something more than the bare possibility that injury or 
harm…will occur from the activity in question’. 120  This means, for example, that the 
exclusion will not apply in relation to action which genuinely related to WHS issues, but 
where those issues had been resolved.121      
6. Is s 19 fit for purpose? 
As noted earlier, ‘industrial action’ was defined in the C&A Act for the first time in 1977, 
and the core concepts enshrined in that definition remain in place today. However, the origins 
of many of those elements can be traced back well before 1977. For example, the concepts of 
‘bans, limitations or restrictions’ on the performance of work, or upon ‘acceptance of or 
offering for work’ are clearly derived from the bans clauses which were such a prominent 
feature of the federal system in the decades before 1969.122 Similarly, the current reference to 
performing work ‘in a manner different from that in which it is customarily performed’ can 
be traced back to former proscriptions upon conduct which interfered with ‘the performance 
of work in accordance with the award’.123  
Significantly, however, these concepts were all developed in a context where the 
legislative purpose was to proscribe industrial action, not to protect it. The current formula is 
used both to proscribe and to protect. It also tries to accommodate industrial tactics which are 
much more sophisticated than what HB Higgins famously described as the ‘rude and 
barbarous processes of strike and lockout’.124 It is manifestly not up to the task. 
This is evident, for example, from the difficulties the courts and tribunals have 
experienced in explicating the concept of a ‘ban’, let alone the performance of work in a 
manner different from that in which it is normally performed, or the adoption of a practice 
which results in ‘a restriction or limitation on, or delay in, the performance of work’. Most 
revealing of all, perhaps, is the fact that, according to the Full Court of the Federal Court in 
David’s Distribution, the concept of industrial action does not extend to picketing. This was a 
form of conduct that did not need to be proscribed under the traditional C&A system because 
it did not relate to conduct which was governed by an award, and was already unlawful at 
common law and under State and Federal statute.125 With the adoption of a system which 
accords at least some level of recognition to the right to take industrial action in furtherance 
                                                            
118 Ibid. See also CFMEU v Beltana Highwall Mining Pty Ltd [2012] FWA 2796, [76]-[77]. 
119 Monadelphous Engineering Associates Pty Ltd v AWU AIRC, PR934966, 18 July 2003, [37]. 
120 Ibid, [37]; citing Franklyn J in Wormald Security Australia Pty Ltd v Peter Rohan, Department of 
Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare (1993) 74 WAIG 2, 3.  
121 See, eg, Qantas Airways Limited v NUW [2007] AIRC 167; Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd v MUA [2010] 
FWA 5196. 
122 See the text accompanying nn 21-22 above. 
123 This form of words was used in s 32(1)(a)(ii) of the C&A Act at the time of its repeal in 1988. 
124 HB Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order’ (1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 13, 13-14. 
125 See the sources cited at n 85, above. 
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of employees’ occupational interests, it is clearly necessary to afford an appropriate level of 
legal protection to peaceful picketing. 
With respect, the position adopted by the Full Court in David’s Distribution was 
clearly based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of the statutory protections. 
It was precisely in order to ‘authorise interference with the rights…of the employer’ and 
‘other affected persons’ that statutory protections were first adopted in the United Kingdom 
in 1906,126 and in Australia in 1993.127  
Taking the Court’s reasoning on its own terms, it is hard to see that it is any less of an 
interference with an employer’s common law rights to prevent them from suing striking 
workers (and their unions) for the torts of conspiracy, intimidation or interference with 
contractual relations than it would be prevent them from suing pickets for the torts of 
nuisance or trespass which were committed in the course of a picket.  
The purpose of the statutory protections is to protect workers and unions against 
common law liability precisely because without such protection they would not be able to 
exercise their right to strike. If, therefore, picketing is to be denied statutory protection, it 
needs to be for a more plausible reason than, as suggested by Wilcox and Cooper JJ, respect 
for a presumption of statutory interpretation against interference with common law rights. 
The specious character of this line of reasoning becomes apparent when it is noted that the 
absence of statutory protection for picketing means that Australia is in breach of the 
international obligations incurred by adhering to the Constitution of the ILO, ratifying 
Convention No 87, and ratifying the ICESCR.128 Given that the legislation is capable of being 
interpreted in a manner that would protect peaceful picketing, the approach adopted by 
Wilcox and Cooper JJ clearly runs counter to the presumption of statutory interpretation that 
legislation is presumed not to violate the rules of international law.129 
The end-result of all of this is that in its current form s 19 makes it impossible for 
employees, unions or employers clearly to determine what forms of action are capable of 
being protected under Part 3-3, and what forms of action are proscribed under the Act. It also 
means that certain forms of conduct which ought to be protected by reason of Australia’s 
international obligations are denied protection.  
This suggests that the FW Act needs to be amended to include a definition of 
employee industrial action which reflects three basic precepts: 
• that the total or partial withdrawal of labour by employees constitutes employee 
industrial action; 
• that employee industrial action also encompasses action which does not involve the 
total or partial withdrawal of labour, but which is intended, and has the capacity, to 
disrupt the normal functioning of all or part of an employer’s business. It should be 
                                                            
126 Trade Disputes Act 1906 (UK). 
127 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) s 31.  
128 See McCrystal, above n 5, 242-243. 
129 See DC Pearce & RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 8th ed, (Lexis Nexis, 2014), 229-30.  
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irrelevant for these purposes whether the conduct actually disrupts the business and/or 
causes embarrassment or reputational damage to the employer. What matters is the 
capacity to disrupt, embarrass etc, and the intent to do so; and 
• that picketing can constitute employee industrial action where employees attend at or 
near premises occupied by, or associated with, a target employer for the purpose of 
peacefully communicating information, including persuading third parties not to enter 
or leave the premises. 
The definition also needs to make clear that the fact that third parties choose not to enter or 
leave premises does not deprive the conduct of the pickets of its character as employee 
industrial action, and does not in itself constitute industrial or unlawful action on the part of 
those third parties who elect not to enter or leave the premises.  
A definition of employee industrial action reflecting these precepts would dispense 
with the need to establish that conduct constitutes a ‘ban’ in 19(1)(b), and the double pronged 
requirement in s 19(a) that action be both work performed in a manner different to which it is 
customarily performed and constitute a restriction, limitation or delay in the performance of 
work. Instead, the focus would shift to whether there was a total or partial withdrawal of 
labour (a ‘strike’), or conduct which was intended, and had the capacity, to disrupt the normal 
functioning of an employer’s business.  
In Energy Australia for example, action to limit the output of generators to 240 
megawatts at certain times of the day would be action intended to disrupt the normal 
functioning of an employer’s business – given that the operation of the business is not 
normally subject to any such limitation. There would be no need to consider whether the 
conduct constituted a ‘ban’, or to engage in the kind of semantic exercises upon which those 
decisions turned.   
As concerns the issues associated with the more creative forms of industrial action 
noted earlier, such action would constitute ‘industrial action’ if the requirement that it 
constitute a restriction, limitation or delay in the performance of work were removed. As 
indicated, action such as the communication of information to the media, the addition of 
campaign messages to emails or voice mail messages, writing emails in caps lock or the 
wearing of campaign clothing will not generally restrict, limit or delay the normal 
performance of work, even where it is intended to do so – but it would disrupt the normal 
operation of the business. This means, for example, that an employee could be disciplined for 
breaching a company code of conduct prohibiting such behaviour even if it were undertaken 
as a part of a campaign of protected industrial action that would not fall within the second 
limb of the definition in s 19(1)(a). A definition focused on an intention to disrupt, 
irrespective of a requirement actually to do so, would mean that such actions would be 
captured and protected where they constituted part of a campaign of protected industrial 
action. 
Where industrial action involves a picket, a definition encompassing these precepts 
would overcome the dubious distinction that must be drawn as a result of David’s 
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Distribution between employees refusing or failing to perform any work at all - which is 
industrial action - and those same employees standing on a picket whilst refusing to work and 
peacefully communicating information or attempting to persuade others not to cross a picket 
– which is not. Such a dichotomy leads to the absurd outcome that an employee is protected 
against dismissal or other adverse consequences in respect of the withdrawal of their labour, 
but not with respect to otherwise peaceful protest activities undertaken whilst their labour is 
withdrawn. 130  Further, while it would extend protection to otherwise peaceful activity 
undertaken on a picket, it would also ensure that a picket could be subject to an order under 
ss 417 or 418 where it constituted unprotected industrial action.   
As noted earlier, the supervisory bodies of the ILO have not treated the employer’s 
capacity to lockout its workforce as the logical corollary of the worker’s right to strike. 
Nevertheless, many legal systems, including Australia’s, do just that.131 The present authors 
are not persuaded that it is appropriate to treat the two phenomena as two sides of the same 
coin.132 The right to strike provides workers with industrial power to counter that held by 
employers through the law of contract and property, rights related to managerial prerogative 
and the ability transnationally to move assets and jobs. A right of lockout is not necessary to 
provide parity at the bargaining table. Nevertheless protection of such a ‘right’ is a reality, 
and it seems most unlikely in political terms that a Government of any political complexion 
would seek to remove legal protection from employer lockouts whilst retaining protection for 
employee action. Accepting that reality, it does seem anomalous that the only tactic available 
to employers should be a full lockout. Logically, if employers are to have the capacity to 
lockout in response to employee claim action they should also be able to engage in action 
short of a lockout – such as banning the working of overtime, withholding contractual 
bonuses, or withdrawing concessions such as cut-price access to goods or services produced 
by the employer. Recognising that employer industrial action can include conduct of this kind 
might be seen to increase the bargaining power of employers, but it would also mean that 
employers could respond to low-key employee industrial action without the cost and 
dislocation for employers, employees and the community which would commonly be 
associated with a lockout.133 
Accepting, without condoning, the parity approach, a revised definition of employer 
industrial action could legitimately include the current s 19(1)(d) and (3), but should also 
seek to accommodate employer conduct which is intended, and has the capacity, to disrupt 
                                                            
130 See eg CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243 where an employee was found lawfully to have 
been terminated from his employment due to his conduct on a picket which was considered by the employer to 
breach company policy. While the employee concerned was not technically engaged in protected industrial 
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protected. 
131 See further Chris Briggs, ‘Lockout Law in a Comparative Perspective: Corporatism, Pluralism and Neo-
Liberalism’ (2005) 21 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 481.  
132 For discussion of the flawed logic which underpins the parity of legal treatment of strikes and lockouts, see 
Novitz, above n 9, 7-8.  
133 See eg Schweppes Australia Pty Ltd v United Voice – Victorian Branch (No 1) (2011) FWA 9329 (155 
employees locked out for 58 days in response to notification of a range of work bans and stoppages of between 
60 minutes and 24 hours).   
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the performance of work by employees – irrespective of whether such disruption actually 
results from the employer’s conduct. Such an approach would capture the type of employer 
conduct challenged in Fletcher, as a ban on rostering workers who had engaged in industrial 
action for voluntary overtime would constitute a response to worker industrial action, 
undertaken to disrupt the performance of work and capacity to earn an income of those 
workers. Crucially, while it would permit such action to occur as part of a campaign of 
employer response industrial action, it would also clarify that such conduct was industrial 
action for the purposes of s 418, enabling a trade union to obtain an order preventing the 
conduct where it was not protected industrial action. However, it would not extend to 
legitimate managerial decisions over business structure, redundancy or re-deployment of 
employees, where such decisions were not retaliatory or intended to disrupt the performance 
of work by employees. 
7. Conclusion 
As noted at the outset, the concept of ‘industrial action’ plays a critical role in the functioning 
of key provisions of the FW Act, including providing the basis for legislative protection 
against common law and statutory liability for organising or participating in industrial action, 
providing a basis for orders to restrain unprotected action, providing the trigger for 
withholding wages of participants in industrial action, and enabling the standing down of 
employees in certain circumstances. It can only be a matter for regret, therefore, that the 
definition of that term is not more clearly drawn. 
Changes to the definition of industrial action of the character outlined above should 
provide the basis for the legislation clearly to identify the circumstances in which employees 
and employers could, and could not, lawfully take industrial action. This appears to provide a 
rather more rational basis both for protecting those forms of industrial action which ought to 
be protected, and for proscribing those forms of industrial conduct which ought to be 
proscribed, than the present agglomeration of relics from the bygone days of the conciliation 
and arbitration system and conceptual confusion as to the legitimate role of industrial action 
in a democratic society. This in turn would make it much easier to adopt a regulatory regime 
which is consistent with international human rights standards, and industrial reality, than is 
presently the case in Australia.                
